

**NOMINATION OF JOHN E. KRINGS TO BE DIRECTOR
OF OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION, DE-
PARTMENT OF DEFENSE**

HEARING

BEFORE THE

**COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE**

NINETY-NINTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

ON

NOMINATION OF

**JOHN E. KRINGS TO BE DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONAL TEST AND
EVALUATION, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE**

MARCH 7, 1985

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NOMINATION OF JOHN E. KRINGS, TO BE DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

THURSDAY, MARCH 7, 1985

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 11:15 a.m., in room SR-222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Barry Goldwater (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Goldwater, Warner, Denton, Nunn, Hart, Levin, and Bingaman.

Staff present: James F. McGovern, staff director and chief counsel; Arnold L. Punaro, staff director for the minority; Alan R. Yuspeh, general counsel; Jeffrey H. Smith, minority counsel; Christine C. Dauth, chief clerk; Alan L. Chvotkin, counsel; Gerald D. Strickler, printing and documents clerk; Robert G. Bell, John J. Hamre, Ronald P. Kelly, and Carl M. Smith, professional staff members; and Marie Chaillet, staff assistant.

Also present: Gerald J. Smith, assistant to Senator Goldwater; Romie L. Brownlee, assistant to Senator Warner; Bernard R. Toon, assistant to Senator Quayle; Allan Cameron, assistant to Senator Denton; Janne E. Nolan and William S. Lind, assistants to Senator Hart; James Steinberg, assistant to Senator Kennedy; Edward McGaffigan, Jr., assistant to Senator Bingaman; and Ralph White, assistant to Senator Levin.

OPENING STATEMENT BY SENATOR BARRY GOLDWATER, CHAIRMAN

Chairman GOLDWATER. I would entertain a motion that a resolution of commendation for Jim Smith, who is leaving the committee staff, be approved in the common form.

Senator WARNER. I so move.

Senator HART. I second it.

Chairman GOLDWATER. Without objection, that is so ordered.

Senator WARNER. I think the record should show that the former chairman of the subcommittee is here.

Chairman GOLDWATER. We are losing a fine man.

Senator HART. The spot will be hard to fill.

Chairman GOLDWATER. Now I would entertain a motion that the rules of the committee be adopted in the same form as they were in the 98th Congress. Copies have been provided to each member.

[The Armed Services Committee Rules of Procedure follow:]

ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE RULES OF PROCEDURE

(Adopted February 24, 1983)

1. *Regular Meeting Day and Time.*—The regular meeting day of the committee shall be each Thursday at 10:00 a.m., unless the committee or the chairman directs otherwise.

2. *Additional Meetings.*—The chairman may call such additional meetings as he deems necessary.

3. *Special Meetings.*—Special meetings of the committee may be called by a majority of the members of the committee in accordance with paragraph 3 of Rule XXVI of the Standing Rules of the Senate.

4. *Open Meetings.*—Each meeting of the committee, or any subcommittee thereof, including meetings to conduct hearings, shall be open to the public, except that a meeting or series of meetings by the committee or a subcommittee thereof on the same subject for a period of no more than fourteen (14) calendar days may be closed to the public on a motion made and seconded to go into closed session to discuss only whether the matters enumerated below in clauses (a) through (f) would require the meeting to be closed, followed immediately by a record vote in open session by a majority of the members of the committee or subcommittee when it is determined that the matters to be discussed or the testimony to be taken at such meeting or meetings—

(a) will disclose matters necessary to be kept secret in the interests of national defense or the confidential conduct of the foreign relations of the United States;

(b) will relate solely to matters of committee staff personnel or internal staff management or procedure;

(c) will tend to charge an individual with a crime or misconduct, to disgrace or injure the professional standing of an individual, or otherwise to expose an individual to public contempt or obloquy or will represent a clearly unwarranted invasion of the privacy of an individual;

(d) will disclose the identity of any informer or law enforcement agent or will disclose any information relating to the investigation or prosecution of a criminal offense that is required to be kept secret in the interests of effective law enforcement;

(e) will disclose information relating to the trade secrets or financial or commercial information pertaining specifically to a given person if—

(1) an Act of Congress requires the information to be kept confidential by Government officers and employees; or

(2) the information has been obtained by the Government on a confidential basis, other than through an application by such person for a specific Government financial or other benefit, and is required to be kept secret in order to prevent undue injury to the competitive position of such person; or (f) may divulge matters required to be kept confidential under other provisions of law or Government regulations.

5. *Presiding Officer.*—The chairman shall preside at all meetings and hearings of the committee except that in his absence the ranking majority member present at the meeting or hearing shall preside unless by majority vote the committee provides otherwise.

6. *Quorum.*—(a) A majority of the members of the committee are required to be actually present to report a matter or measure from the committee.

(b) Except as provided in subsections (a) and (c), and other than for the conduct of hearings, six members of the committee shall constitute a quorum for the transaction of such business as may be considered by the committee.

(c) Three members of the committee, one of whom shall be a member of the minority party, shall constitute a quorum for the purpose of taking sworn testimony, unless otherwise ordered by a majority of the full committee.

(d) Proxy votes may not be considered for the purpose of establishing a quorum.

7. *Proxy Voting.*—Proxy voting shall be allowed on all measures and matters before the committee. The vote by proxy of any member of the committee may be counted for the purpose of reporting any measure or matter to the Senate if the absent member casting such vote has been informed of the matter on which he is being recorded and has affirmatively requested that he be so recorded.

8. *Announcement of Votes.*—The results of all rollcall votes taken in any meeting of the committee on any measure, or amendment thereto, shall be announced in the committee report, unless previously announced by the committee. The announcement shall include a tabulation of the votes cast in favor and votes cast in opposition to each such measure and amendment by each member of the committee who was present at such meeting. The chairman may hold open a rollcall vote on any

measure or matter which is before the committee until no later than midnight of the day on which the committee votes on such measure or matter.

9. *Subpoenas.*—Subpoenas for attendance of witnesses and for the production of memoranda, documents, records, and the like may be issued by the chairman or any other member designated by him, but only when authorized by a majority of the members of the committee. The subpoena shall briefly state the matter to which the witness is expected to testify or the documents to be produced.

10. *Hearings.*—(a) Public notice shall be given of the date, place, and subject matter of any hearing to be held by the committee, or any subcommittee thereof, at least 1 week in advance of such hearing, unless the committee or subcommittee determines that good cause exists for beginning such hearing at an earlier time.

(b) Hearings may be initiated only by the specified authorization of the committee or subcommittee.

(c) Hearings shall be held only in the District of Columbia unless specifically authorized to be held elsewhere by a majority vote of the committee or subcommittee conducting such hearings.

(d) Witnesses appearing before the committee shall file with the clerk of the committee a written statement of his proposed testimony at least 24 hours not including weekends or holidays prior to a hearing at which he is to appear unless the chairman and the ranking minority member determines that there is good cause for the failure of the witness to file such a statement.

(e) Confidential testimony taken or confidential material presented in a closed hearing of the committee or subcommittee or any report of the proceeding of such hearing shall not be made public in whole or in part or by way of summary unless authorized by a majority vote of the committee or subcommittee.

(f) Any witness summoned to give testimony or evidence at a public or closed hearing of the committee or subcommittee may be accompanied by counsel of his own choosing who shall be permitted at all times during such hearing to advise such witness of his legal rights.

(g) Witnesses providing unsworn testimony to the committee may be given a transcript of such testimony for the purpose of making minor grammatical corrections. Such witnesses will not, however, be permitted to alter the substance of their testimony. Any question involving such corrections shall be decided by the chairman.

11. *Nominations.*—Unless otherwise ordered by the committee, nominations referred to the committee shall be held for at least seven (7) days before being voted on by the committee. Each member of the committee shall be furnished a copy of all nominations referred to the committee.

12. *Real Property Transactions.*—Each member of the committee shall be furnished with a copy of the proposals of the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, submitted pursuant to 10 U.S.C. 2662 and with a copy of the proposals of the Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, submitted pursuant to 50 U.S.C. App 2285, regarding the proposed acquisition or disposition of property of an estimated price or rental of more than \$50,000. Any member of the committee objecting to or requesting information on a proposed acquisition or disposal shall communicate his objection or request to the chairman of the committee within thirty (30) days from the date of submission.

13. *Legislative Calendar.*—(a) The clerk of the committee shall keep a printed calendar for the information of each committee members showing the bills introduced and referred to the committee and the status of such bills. Such calendar shall be revised from time to time to show pertinent changes in such bills, the current status thereof, and new bills introduced and referred to the committee. A copy of each new revision shall be furnished to each member of the committee.

(b) Unless otherwise ordered, measures referred to the committee shall be referred by the clerk of the committee to the appropriate department or agency of the Government for reports thereon.

14. Except as otherwise specified herein, the Standing Rules of the Senate shall govern the actions of the committee. Each subcommittee of the committee is part of the committee, and is therefore subject to the committee's rules so far as applicable.

15. *Powers and Duties of Subcommittees.*—Each subcommittee is authorized to meet, hold hearings, receive evidence, and report to the full committee on all matters referred to it. Subcommittee chairmen shall set dates for hearings and meetings of their respective subcommittees after consultation with the chairman and other subcommittee chairmen with a view toward avoiding simultaneous scheduling of full committee and subcommittee meetings or hearings whenever possible.

Senator BINGAMAN. Mr. Chairman, could I just ask one item before we go on that motion? I have been concerned the last 2

years that in preparations for markups we seldom, or at least I seldom, have been able to get the markup book 24 hours before the markup occurs.

I notice we have a rule here that requires that witnesses appearing before the committee file written testimony at least 24 hours before the hearing. I don't know if we need to include markups in the rule, but if there is any way we could get some kind of a consensus that we get 24 hours to review the markup materials before we have to go into the markup hearing, that would be a great help to me, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GOLDWATER. I should say that is the rule.

Senator BINGAMAN. I have not been able to find it in here.

Chairman GOLDWATER. Well, it is a rule. Anyone who testifies before the committee is requested to provide their testimony at least 24 hours in advance. Now, that is not always possible.

Senator BINGAMAN. I know that is the case, and we have a rule with regard to testimony. But I am thinking of the markups that we do in the subcommittee and full committee. I have been unable to get the markup materials 24 hours before the markup starts so that I and my staff can review those.

Chairman GOLDWATER. We will see that that happens if it is at all possible. I know there have been times when I as chairman of a subcommittee have not had access to this information when I have wanted it, but generally it has been satisfactory.

But I think you have a good point, and let us put it this way: We will do everything we can to make that happen.

Senator BINGAMAN. I would appreciate that, Mr. Chairman. I really do not think it is so much a question of majority versus minority on the committee. I just think that as a Senator I have great difficulty understanding the issues that the staff feels very comfortable about, and I would like to have some knowledge of what my vote is resulting in.

Chairman GOLDWATER. We all do.

Senator HART. Mr. Chairman, this is no reflection at all on the new chairman's position, but over the 10 years I have been on this committee I cannot recall greater negligence on the part of witnesses in terms of meeting the 24-hour testimony rule. Getting the witnesses, both in and out of uniform, to get their testimony up here a day ahead of time has been almost impossible.

Chairman GOLDWATER. I could not agree with you more.

Senator HART. I do not know what instructions we can give our staff to force an improvement at the Pentagon. But the situation, as it stands, is totally unacceptable.

Chairman GOLDWATER. Well, the staff has their instructions. I have personally gotten into this with people in the Pentagon. I would say, on general routine matters there should be no problem. But when we get into matters like we were discussing today, we find that there has not been any thought given to the advanced tactical aircraft. That is something that you and I would assume they would have taken care of.

So let us leave it this way. We will do our best to get that corrected. I think the sooner we can have the testimony of the military people, the better. Lord knows this is a very complicated subject.

Senator HART. I think it is less important on technical issues, because most of us are not technicians anyway. But on policy questions, we cannot do our job effectively if we are forced to walk in and pick up a 25-page document and read it for the first time, especially if the testimony reflects some shift in policy or emphasis. There is no reason in the world why we should not be provided the testimony with sufficient time to review it.

Chairman GOLDWATER. Well, there are times when there is reason, but I do not think it should happen as often as it does.

Mr. McGOVERN. Senator, your point is well stated. We have been asking the Pentagon for witnesses to have testimony over here 72 hours in advance, to give ourselves some time. But you are right, and we are doing a little bit better this year than we have in the past.

The only way to actually enforce that is for you, the chairman and ranking members, to cancel the hearing when they do not have it over here 24 hours in advance of the hearing. That is the only way, I have said that before, and nobody cancels the hearings.

Senator HART. Mr. Chairman, you have my proxy. If we do it about three times, we might see some results. What do they say to you when you bring this up over there?

Mr. McGOVERN. I simply need more leverage with the Pentagon; and we always threaten to recommend that we are going to cancel the hearing and yet we never follow through.

Senator HART. Well, do they give you a reason why they cannot get their testimony over?

Mr. McGOVERN. It is always "the check is in the mail, the draft will be there in a couple of minutes". [Laughter.]

Chairman GOLDWATER. It might interest you to know, Gary, that we are doing a study—that is, my own personal staff is doing a study—on the amount of time that the people in the Pentagon spend on this Hill. And I daresay they spend more time on the Hill than they spend in the Pentagon. And that may be all right.

Senator HART. No; it is not all right. It is awful.

Chairman GOLDWATER. Well, I would agree with you. But some people might think it is all right if they never went there.

Senator HART. Well, Mr. Chairman, if we had all read testimony or at least had it available to us and no one had to summarize it, we could just start in with questions. That would save the witness' time.

Chairman GOLDWATER. That is exactly what I would like to do.

Senator HART. Why should we have somebody read us something that we can read ourselves in half the time the night before?

Chairman GOLDWATER. I have been saying that for 20 years.

Senator HART. Well, I have been saying it for 10, so that is 30 years between us.

Chairman GOLDWATER. I have one more motion that I would like to entertain: that there be six subcommittees, with chairmen, ranking members, and membership as reflected on sheets that have been distributed.

Senator HART. I so move.

Chairman GOLDWATER. Without objection, that is so ordered.

[The subcommittees follow:]

SUBCOMMITTEE ASSIGNMENTS

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, 99TH CONGRESS

Subcommittee on Military Construction

Senator Thurmond (<i>Chairman</i>)	Senator Bingaman (<i>Ranking</i>)
Senator Warner	Senator Stennis
Senator Humphrey	Senator Hart
Senator East	

Subcommittee on Strategic and Theater Nuclear Forces

Senator Warner (<i>Chairman</i>)	Senator Hart (<i>Ranking</i>)
Senator Goldwater	Senator Nunn
Senator Thurmond	Senator Stennis
Senator Cohen	Senator Exon
Senator Quayle	Senator Levin
Senator Wilson	

Subcommittee on Preparedness

Senator Humphrey (<i>Chairman</i>)	Senator Dixon (<i>Ranking</i>)
Senator Goldwater	Senator Levin
Senator East	Senator Kennedy
Senator Denton	Senator Glenn
Senator Gramm	

Subcommittee on Sea Power and Force Projection

Senator Cohen (<i>Chairman</i>)	Senator Exon (<i>Ranking</i>)
Senator Quayle	Senator Nunn
Senator Wilson	Senator Stennis
Senator Denton	Senator Hart
Senator Gramm	

Subcommittee on Manpower and Personnel

Senator Wilson (<i>Chairman</i>)	Senator Glenn (<i>Ranking</i>)
Senator Thurmond	Senator Nunn
Senator Cohen	Senator Exon
Senator East	Senator Kennedy
Senator Denton	

Subcommittee on Defense Acquisition Policy

Senator Quayle (<i>Chairman</i>)	Senator Levin (<i>Ranking</i>)
Senator Goldwater	Senator Bingaman
Senator Warner	Senator Dixon
Senator Humphrey	Senator Glenn
Senator Gramm	

Chairman GOLDWATER. Now, another matter of business. The committee will consider, this morning, the nomination of John Krings to be the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation at the Department of Defense. This is a new position created by the Congress in the 1984 DOD Authorization Act. Mr. Krings will be the first nominee to hold this important post.

Mr. Krings has spent most of his career as a professional test pilot. He has made significant personal contributions to the design, development, test, and evaluation of the F-4, F-15, and F-18 aircraft. Mr. Krings served for a number of years as the chief test pilot for McDonnell Douglas Corp. He is presently director, U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps programs, for McDonnell Douglas.

I should note for the record of this hearing that Mr. Krings will retire from McDonnell Douglas on or about April 2 of this year,

and he will not assume any of his responsibilities at the Department of Defense until his retirement from that corporation.

Mr. Krings is a graduate of Louisiana State University. He served from 1952 to 1956 in the Air Force as a fighter pilot, and has also completed the Navy test pilot school. I believe Mr. Krings brings substantial experience to the position for which he has been nominated by our President, and I feel we are fortunate to have a person of his ability willing to accept this difficult assignment.

I should also note for the record that Mr. Krings has met with the staff of the committee to review his financial holdings. There will be no conflict of interest between Mr. Krings' finances and his governmental responsibilities.

Mr. Krings is joined today by his wife, Joan—it is good to have you with us—who I have recognized.

I wanted to recognize Senator Nunn, who will be here shortly. But I would like to ask Senator Warner—you get more people from Virginia jobs up here. [Laughter.]

Senator WARNER. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GOLDWATER. Is that the quality of the people from your State?

Senator WARNER. Well, the facts speak for themselves, Mr. Chairman. [Laughter.]

Chairman GOLDWATER. You go ahead and introduce Mr. Krings.

Senator WARNER. I think the Chair has done a more than adequate job of introducing the nominee, so I will just submit my statement for the record. I think it is fortunate that we have a person of his background and qualifications who is willing to take on this new public service.

In doing so Mr. Krings, you will, hopefully, forge a record that will make this position permanent, because it is one that I think is pretty much a creature of the Congress, and as such there may be some reluctance for the Secretary and other Secretaries to keep it in existence. Assuming that you will provide the record for justifying it, the Congress will keep it, and we welcome you.

[The prepared statement of Senator John Warner follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN W. WARNER

It is a privilege for me to have the honor of nominating for the position of Director of Operational Test and Evaluation, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Mr. Jack Krings.

This is a new position in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, established by the Congress to provide increased objectivity in the testing of the weapons systems we are developing and procuring.

Jack Krings is exceptionally well qualified for this job.

He is originally from Pennsylvania, but is now a resident of the Commonwealth of Virginia.

Jack graduated from Louisiana State University with a B.S. in chemistry and physics and a commission in the U.S. Air Force.

After 4 years of flying fighters in the Air Force, he joined McDonnell Aircraft in 1956 as an engineer, but continued flying fighters with the Air National Guard.

Shortly thereafter, he started flying F-3H Demons and F-101 Voodoo's at McDonnell.

Jack attended the U.S. Navy Test Pilot School, returning to St. Louis to participate in the F-4 Phantom development program.

Along with testing all models of the F-4, he participated in the design and development of the F-15 Eagle.

Jack did the spin tests on the F-15, for which he received the Society of Experimental Test Pilots' "Test Pilot of the Year" Award in 1975.

In November 1978 he flew the first flight of the F-18 Hornet.

Jack was the director of flight operations for McDonnell, actively flying F-15's and F-18's before moving to Washington, D.C. in October 1983 as director, U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps programs for McDonnell Douglas Corp.

Jack's wife Joan is with us today. I regret that their children could not be here for this occasion.

It is my pleasure to recommend Jack Krings to the committee and I urge his immediate confirmation.

Chairman GOLDWATER. The nomination reference and biographical sketch of Mr. Krings will be inserted in the record at this point.

[The nomination reference and biographical sketch of Mr. Krings follow:]

NOMINATION REFERENCE

SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES,
Washington, DC, February 8, 1985.

(Under authority of the order of the Senate of January 3, 1985)

Ordered, that the following nomination be referred to the Committee on Armed Services:

John E. Krings, of Virginia, to be Director of Operational Test and Evaluation, Department of Defense. (New position—P.L. 98-94 of September 24, 1983.)

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF JOHN E. (JACK) KRINGS, DIRECTOR—USN/USMC AIRCRAFT GROUP, McDONNELL DOUGLAS CORP.

Education.—Central Catholic High School, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania; Duquesne University, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania; Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, LA., B.S. chemistry and physics—1952; and U.S. Navy Test Pilot School, Patuxent River, Maryland, 1960—Class 29.

Personal.—Born—April 2, 1930. Military Service—USAF: 1952-56, fighter pilot. ANG: 1956-60, fighter pilot—captain. Married, Joan M. Krings—4 children—ages 19-29.

Employment.—USAF (1952-56). McDonnell Aircraft/MDC (1956-present). Progression: Flight test data engineer; production test pilot; engineering test pilot; chief test pilot; director—flight operations; and director—(present). Production testing: F-3H, F-101, F-4, F-15, F-18. Experimental testing: F-101, F-4, F-15, F-18. Flight evaluation.

30-years experience.—Recognized by military test and evaluation community as industry spokesman for contractor flight test and evaluation.

Significant personal contribution to design, development, test and evaluation from concept formulation through production of three major aircraft: F-4, F-15, and F-18.

Extensive participation in planning, managing and executing F-15 and F-18 full scale development programs.

Inventor of Up Front Control [UFC] and Target Designator Control [TDC] for contemporary cockpit designs. Now a standard in all new cockpit designs.

Personally planned, managed and conducted F-15 spin test program, including flight control design changes to reduce spin susceptibility and increase recovery potential. Test record and operational record reflect substantial improvement and new standard for fighter aircraft.

Active personal involvement in contemporary avionics design, development and testing including PD radar development (APG-63 and APG-65) air-to-air and air-to-ground.

Prime participant in RF-101/RF-4 reconnaissance radar mapping, terrain avoidance/following systems design, development, testing and evaluation.

Planned and flew first flight series for F-18. Often intense personal involvement in design and development of control laws and flying qualities.

Champion and prime advocate of F-18 flight control maneuvering enhancement and "G" limiter system.

Continuous participation in military flight operations with USAF, USN and allied foreign Air Forces, including SEA and Israeli combat operations.

Ten year participant and chairman of Flight Test Operating Committee of AIA. Most recent test and evaluation activity in F-15 DRF avionics and performance, F-18 foreign evaluations and demonstrations.

Actively continue F-15/F-18 flight activity.

Professional activities/awards.—SETP Kinchloe award—1975; SETP fellow; AIAA associate fellow; past chairman flight test operations com./AIA; SETP president candidate.

Publications/presentations.—McDonnell Aircraft Company's experience and viewpoint on Stall/Post Stall Region of Flight—J.E. Krings and W.B. Weber, 15 Dec. 1971. F-15 spin tests—J.E. Krings, 25 Sept. 1975. Prime contractor contact with U.S. and foreign military pilots—F-4 program. Regular author/contributor MCAIR product support publications, USAF safety publications, F-18 papers (2), Anderson Awards (SETP), Flight Spin Paper (1), Tenhoff Award (SETP).

References.—M/G Pete Odgers, Commander, AFFTC. Charles Crawford, USA, Technology Chief. RADM Ned Hogan, Commander, Naval Air Test Center. Bill Gregory, editor, Aviation Week. Chuck Yeager, B/G (Ret.), test pilot. Don Engen, FAA Administrator.

Industry contemporaries: (References)—C.A. McDaniels, Hughes Aircraft; Chuck Sewell, Grumman; Phil Ostreicher, G.D.; "Doug" Benefeld, Rockwell; Hal Farley, Lockheed; Don Wilson, LTV; Russ Scott, Northrop; and Wendell Shawler, Fairchild.

Chairman GOLDWATER. Mr. Krings, if you have any statement you would like to make, you may.

STATEMENT OF JOHN E. KRINGS, OF VIRGINIA, TO BE DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Mr. KRINGS. I do have a statement, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee: I appreciate the opportunity to meet with you to discuss my nomination to be the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation within the Department of Defense. You are aware of my background and that I have worked for the McDonnell Douglas Corp. for the last 29 years.

I would like to take this opportunity to explain why I believe that my prior experience provides me with an appropriate background to assume the duties of the independent director of operational test and evaluation. During my tenure with McDonnell Douglas, I have had a number of test-related duties.

But more important than that, my organization was given the responsibility of working independently of the engineering, manufacturing, and marketing forces, and was charged with being the consumer advocate for the corporation. We answered directly to the chief executive and he expected us to ensure that our product was the best for the customer.

I see a close analogy between my duties there with the duties of the director of operational test and evaluation. The Director of OT&E should be the advocate of the customer, who in this case is the soldier, the sailor, or the pilot, who should expect that the equipment provided to him is the best in the world and that it will work effectively in combat.

If confirmed for this position, I will dedicate myself to ensuring that the weapons systems being procured by the Department of Defense have been thoroughly tested and are operationally effective and suitable for combat.

Sir, may I now answer any of your questions?

Chairman GOLDWATER. Mr. Krings, what is your general assessment of the effectiveness of operational test and evaluation in the services as you are familiar with it?

Mr. KRINGS. I think it is the most critical event that goes on prior to the weapons system actually being in the hands of the

combat person. Other things certainly play a part, but it is probably the most contributing factor to ensure that what the combatant gets will in fact allow him to succeed in combat, which should be the goal of everybody involved.

Chairman GOLDWATER. For example, on the F-15, how many pilots were engaged at one time or another in the testing of that bird?

Mr. KRINGS. I would say from its inception, from the first flight until—let us just cut it off at the point where the squadron got its first airplane. There were probably at least 50 to 60 individual pilots involved at one time or another through the development, and maybe more than that. But I would say a minimum of 50 pilots.

Chairman GOLDWATER. Is the testing among that many pilots divided up for specific purposes of tests, or is the testing usually routine?

Mr. KRINGS. There are basically three types of participants: one being the contractor who designed and developed the airplane; and then the developmental testers, the military organization that is charged with ensuring that the specifications are met; and then the operational testers, who are people who are operationally oriented, but have some expertise in testing.

Ultimately the operator himself, the tactical organization, participates in that testing cycle. So that by the time it gets to the first combat person, it has been evaluated by professional testers and operational people.

Chairman GOLDWATER. Do you remember, just for the heck of it, how many hours of testing the F-15 had?

Mr. KRINGS. I honestly do not remember that number. We participated for approximately 4 years, but the last few years with a much, much lower participation rate.

Chairman GOLDWATER. Do you feel that we need more testing at an earlier stage in the development cycle?

Mr. KRINGS. Yes; and I think there are a number of different ways that we can test. We should try to ensure that our testing view of things is contemporary with the equipment that we are testing and today's high technology era.

There are probably things that we can do in testing that match the technology of the weapon, and I think that it can—certainly, insights to testing should be done actually during the formulation stage and all the way through the whole development stage, because there are things that can be tested early and there are judgments that can be made before progressing to an irreversible point.

Chairman GOLDWATER. In your capacity as a company test pilot, has the company paid close attention to what you report? When you come down from a flight and say something is wrong here, do they try to follow through on your suggestions and do they work with you on that problem?

Mr. KRINGS. Yes; they do, Mr. Chairman. We had an opportunity to be involved from the conceptual stage all the way through the transition and introduction into the service, so we had the serviceman's knowledge and feedback, so that when we spoke we did in fact represent the customer.

We had a scheme of operations there where, much to the chagrin of some of the people, we were a little more effective than they thought they would like us to be, because we were able to alter the course of the development of an airplane. And this was a healthy responsibility, so the people had to learn how to do it with discipline, because we were very, very effective.

Chairman GOLDWATER. One more question. Should we feel it necessary to ask you to come here to testify before us on the operational qualities of any aircraft, can you do that with the full feeling that you are free to speak your personal mind on the matter and you are not subject to the will of the Air Force, the Navy, et cetera, on whether or not they want the aircraft as it is?

Mr. KRINGS. Absolutely. This was a point that was understood prior to my agreement to do this, especially with the Secretary, Secretary Weinberger. These were all expressed assurances, so I feel very, very confident that I can do that.

Chairman GOLDWATER. This question is off the record.

[Discussion off the record.]

Chairman GOLDWATER. Senator Nunn, do you have some questions?

Senator NUNN. Just a couple, Mr. Chairman.

I think Mr. Krings is very qualified for this job. I like what I hear about your approaching it with independence and that you feel you have the authority to be independent. Is that a correct impression?

Mr. KRINGS. Yes, sir, I certainly do.

Senator NUNN. You feel free to express your judgment in the Pentagon, on Capitol Hill and in the appropriate forum?

Mr. KRINGS. Yes, sir, absolutely.

Senator NUNN. Mr. Krings, one procedural matter. You're now an employee of McDonnell Douglas; is that right?

Mr. KRINGS. Yes, sir.

Senator NUNN. My understanding is you wish to remain an employee until April 2, so you may retire with full benefits; is that correct?

Mr. KRINGS. That is correct.

Senator NUNN. Congress fenced some \$39 million in funds available for the activities of the Director of Test and Evaluation until you are confirmed, and I understand the Defense Department needs those funds now urgently. Accordingly, the Senate is being asked to give its advice and consent to your nomination before you are actually planning on coming aboard; is that correct?

Mr. KRINGS. Yes, sir.

Senator NUNN. It is my understanding you have agreed not to serve in any capacity whatsoever in the Department of Defense until April 3, after you retire from McDonnell Douglas; is that correct?

Mr. KRINGS. That is correct, sir.

Senator NUNN. What will you be doing between now and the time you take office?

Mr. KRINGS. Trying to clean up my affairs at the company. I will be nonactive in my former role with the company, and I will be taking a little bit of vacation. And there are some preliminary things at the Pentagon that are not of substance, those mundane

things like getting parking passes and filling out forms. Some of this can be accomplished to save a little bit of time.

In fact, there is only a few weeks between now and then, and I do not intend to participate in any McDonnell Douglas activities with the military service or the Government, nor to participate in any activities at the Pentagon.

So I have really a couple weeks off, basically.

Senator NUNN. Will you be paid by McDonnell Douglas through April 2?

Mr. KRINGS. Yes, sir.

Senator NUNN. Will you receive any pay from the Department of Defense during that period?

Mr. KRINGS. No; none whatsoever.

Senator NUNN. So you will be on only one payroll?

Mr. KRINGS. Yes.

Senator NUNN. That will be the private payroll, and you will shift to the public payroll on April 3?

Mr. KRINGS. Yes, sir.

Senator NUNN. You will not handle any matters of substance in the Pentagon until you are terminated at McDonnell Douglas?

Mr. KRINGS. That is correct, sir.

Senator NUNN. Thank you.

Could you just tell us a little more—I know you already have—about how you view this job, and what understanding you have as to what the Department of Defense and the Congress will look to you for?

Mr. KRINGS. I share the views that were expressed during the hearing that created the job and understand them, and I do not find any difference in views of opinions or plans other than those that were expressed during that time. I think that the bill itself at this point in time, to the best of my knowledge, is encompassing enough to ensure that the job will be prosecuted the way it was intended and the teeth will be in there to accomplish what is expected.

Very basically, it is to, first, approve any operational testing plans, to observe and monitor them, and then ultimately to report on their progress and success, both in terms of quality and quantity and successfulness.

Senator NUNN. Do you, from your outside observation of the Department of Defense—and I know you have had a lot of experience in working with defense items over the years—do you see the need for this type of position within the Department?

Mr. KRINGS. Yes; I do. But hopefully it will be a transitory thing. I think that we would all hopefully like to get back to the point where the credibility is reestablished and we do not need a series of checkers. Obviously, that does not exist at this point or I doubt if this job would have been created.

But one hopes that over a period of time that my contribution and the contribution of others will reestablish a credible relationship between both the public and the Congress concerning the testing activity and the quality of testing that is being done. I do not want to infer that I am trying to get out of a job, but ultimately some of the checks and balances might be a little luxurious in our economy, and we would like to get it done a little bit better.

Senator NUNN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GOLDWATER. Senator Hart.

Senator HART. Mr. Krings, would you expand on your last statement?

Mr. KRINGS. I think that when we have some doubt or reluctance to accept somebody else's word, we tend to generate more and more checks and balances, when in fact we would like to have it done well and effectively the first time.

The generation of this particular office or this particular job I think is a reaction to people's reluctance to accept the initial word and they want another opinion, basically. We would like to hope that as time goes on we become more confident that it is being done right the first time, and perhaps we can eliminate some of the additional checks and balances that maybe we do not need if people are doing their job correctly in the first place.

Senator HART. So in other words, you see your job as a temporary one?

Mr. KRINGS. No; I do not think so. I think that the effectiveness of the job may reduce the numbers of times that we have to do things. If we are successful in the long term, we could actually eliminate redundant testing, not eliminate testing certainly, but eliminate some of the redundancy in testing that is done today and get an equally good product and save a little bit of time and money.

Senator HART. Well, that gets to a philosophical question of whether independent testing or independent evaluation is a technological function or one that flows from a reflection of human nature. Without in any way casting an asperation or doubt about the people in the defense contracting business, it is human nature, whether you are in defense contracting or putting siding on houses, to want to make the maximum profit. There is nothing wrong with that, except when it is done at the expense of both the taxpayer and the national security.

My own predisposition, as one who helped bring about the creation of this office, is that it ought to be a permanent office. Even if you fixed everything in today's system, 5 or 10 years down the road somebody is going to start cutting corners again and not undertaking the kind of evaluation that an independent person like yourself or your office is designed to do.

Mr. KRINGS. I firmly agree in your view of the independence that is absolutely necessary, and that our ultimate goal is to ensure that the combatant gets the best equipment. Perhaps it is my naivete up here, and I may learn to understand that a little more after I have been more involved in the workings of the Pentagon and the Washington scene.

Senator HART. I do not want to get off the subject here, but this recent business with General Dynamics is part of what I am talking about. There seems to be a cycle in which somebody does something they should not do, and there is a hue and cry in the press and the Congress. We slap their wrists, and everybody behaves for a while. Then pretty soon somebody is back buying dinners for Members of Congress or giving gifts to their wives.

What Congress tried to do in creating this office was to build a check in there, a check that is really designed to address human nature.

Mr. KRINGS. I certainly think a No. 1 goal would be to establish the consistence of independent evaluations, yes.

Senator HART. Which would mean that you cannot, in the long term, work yourself out of a job.

Mr. KRINGS. That is correct.

Senator HART. Could you tell us if there were any cases that you were involved in or aware of at McDonnell Douglas where a system or program turned out to be deficient and that information was not passed on to the customer?

Mr. KRINGS. That was a fairly typical mode of operation, 20 years ago. In the recent years, for both mutual benefits, we tried to involve the customer, the customer being the military person, very early in the design and development of equipment, as others do, not just at McDonnell, because they really have the true perspective of what ultimately has to be done with the weapon, as opposed to the designer and the developer and the engineer.

So nowadays it is a much more open environment, in which the military and the Government does know in fact everything that is going on from day one, and if they do not it is their own fault. I have not seen situations in the last 10 years in which there has been any reluctance on the part of the contractor to make the Government representative, whomever it might be, aware of what is going on.

Senator HART. At least in the last 10 years, you are not aware of any instance at McDonnell Douglas on any program that you were involved in where a deficiency in the system was found and not immediately reported to the customer?

Mr. KRINGS. That is correct. In fact, it is literally impossible now.

Senator HART. What, if anything, did you tell McDonnell Douglas about the range deficiencies in the attack role of the F-18?

Mr. KRINGS. In our particular role as the developing testers, as opposed to the operational testers, our test is more to specification. The users' desires are translated into numerical quantities and we then try to achieve those, compared to those numerical quantities.

Early in the phase of the F-18, as unfortunately it is with many airplanes, we were not meeting the numerically required performance that would translate into operational range. As the development went on, this improved, as it normally does in all airplanes.

So we were not really required per se to answer the operational range question. We were asked to answer the translation of that into technical or measurable numbers during development. And we did find, absolutely, in the early phase of the airplane we were not achieving that. That was not the only thing we were not achieving. There were a lot of other problems that existed early in the airplane that it was our job, which we did, to report and make the customer immediately aware of any of the deficiencies at that point in time and determine which can be fixed and what the efforts would be.

Senator HART. The first part of your answer seemed to suggest, if the customer does not ask the right question, you are not under any obligation to provide the information.

Mr. KRINGS. No; I did not mean to create that impression, because there is a responsibility on our part to acquaint the customer with the quality of the product as it is when he is first going to see it.

We have customer participation. The pilot, in this case airplanes, the military pilot flies the airplane very, very early. After about the 10th flight, the military is flying the airplane, and so it is painfully obvious what the qualities of the airplane are very early in its existence. It is not a case of denial of information.

We try to advise them what to look for actually, the good and the bad, because we have got to make it work. There is absolutely no point in avoiding the issues.

Senator HART. So at every stage that you were aware of range deficiencies in the attack mode, the purchaser was as well?

Mr. KRINGS. Absolutely.

Senator HART. Are there any ongoing programs, Mr. Krings, at McDonnell Douglas, where there are program or system deficiencies, which the customer, the service, is not aware of?

Mr. KRINGS. Honestly, none that I know of that they are not immediately aware of.

Senator HART. Mr. Chairman, I would like permission of the committee to be recorded as present on this nomination. That is not a reflection at all on Mr. Krings or his qualifications, which are extraordinary. This is one of the most important nominations this committee could take up in terms of national security and the interest of the taxpayers.

There are some of us who were instrumental in creating the office, who are going to meet informally with Mr. Krings, and I would like a chance to pursue some of these issues in more depth. I do not wish to vote yea or nay at this time.

Chairman GOLDWATER. You will be recorded as present.

Senator Levin, do you have any questions?

Senator LEVIN. I do, Mr. Chairman. And I have some of the same feelings which Senator Hart has just expressed about the importance of this office, and I share them very strongly.

As one who was deeply involved in the creation of this office, I have had an opportunity to meet with Mr. Krings and I feel that indeed he is well qualified. And I understand why others feel strongly about this office and would want indeed to have that same opportunity that I had.

Mr. Chairman, I have an opening statement which I would like to be made a part of the record.

Chairman GOLDWATER. That will be done.

[The prepared statement of Senator Levin follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN

Mr. Chairman: Today we are considering the nomination of the first Director of the Office of Operational Weapons Testing. As one of the principal sponsors of the bill creating this office I have strong feelings about the kind of role this office should play within the Department of Defense. The person first appointed to this office will be instrumental in setting the style and tone of this office.

Over the last several years there have been numerous instances of weapons systems that were not working as intended. When we first began working on the bill to create this office, the controversial system in the news was the Pershing missile. If you remember, we were testing those missiles in anticipation of their December

1983 deployment in Europe, and the results were dismal. Now 3 years later, we read in the paper that during cold-weather testing the Divad system is requiring the equivalent of hair dryers to heat the mechanisms that aim the antiaircraft gun on that system. Too many systems that work well in contractor facilities, under carefully monitored conditions, just do not fare with normal users under normal battlefield conditions.

As a result of these concerns Senators Pryor, Roth, and I introduced a bill in April of 1983. This bill was subsequently added to the fiscal year 1984 DOD authorization bill on the floor, and now nearly 2 years later we have before this committee Mr. Krings, the man nominated to be the first director of this office. This office was long overdue. There had been a well-documented need for such an office for more than a decade by the time we introduced this bill. A blue ribbon panel appointed by President Nixon issued an exhaustive study in 1970 which concluded that operational testing conducted by the services was not effectively identifying faulty weapons and halting production in time for improvements to be made. The panel concluded further that the operational testing being conducted lacked objectivity, and received little guidance or encouragement from upper levels of Pentagon management.

In addition to the panel created by President Nixon, the Joint Chiefs of Staff reached the same conclusion in their research and development document that year. The Joint Chiefs stated "operational test and evaluation is the final essential step in the research, development, test and evaluation process: As such it needs increasing support and expansion as weapons systems become more complex and interdependent."

The GAO joined this chorus in 1979 with a report that concluded, "operational testing is important in predicting how well new weapons systems will work and can be invaluable in identifying ineffective and unreliable systems before they are produced. However, test results have not been adequately reported to Congress in the past, and consequently, Congress has not received the information it needs in considering procurement decisions."

Mr. Chairman, as recently as this past fall both the Governmental Affairs Committee and this committee held hearings on the issue of the Divad gun. As you well remember, one of the main issues in our hearing was the adequacy of testing of the gun and in fact, whether portions of the testing data were withheld from the Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council [DSARC] when the council was considering the decision to proceed to full-scale development.

The nominee this morning will have the power to remedy some of these problems as well as provide the members of this committee with vital information we need to make intelligent decisions on weapons systems. In many ways a nominee for this office should possess some of the same qualities one would expect to see in a nominee for the position of Inspector General. He must be independent, a person of total integrity, and one who will ensure that fair tests will be performed on the systems we buy and who will "let the chips fall where they may."

I met with Mr. Krings last week and I said all of these things to him there. I encourage him to go over there and be a strong advocate for the people in the field, ultimately the men and women whose very lives will depend on the safeguards that we will be in a position to insist on. I can think of no greater obligation or challenge and I look forward to working with him in months and years to come.

Senator LEVIN. I have a few questions along the lines that you had as to the relative independence of this office, and then that would be all that I would need this morning.

Mr. Krings, do you believe that you have the independence to recommend that a system be delayed, postponed, or canceled because of poor performance during operational testing?

Mr. KRINGS. Yes; I do.

Senator LEVIN. Would you feel that you had that power, despite adverse pressure from the Secretary's office?

Mr. KRINGS. I do not know. I am not certain. I am not certain that my view and my disapproval, if we could call it that for the moment, would be the absolute decisionmaking event. Hopefully, and I have been given every assurance that it will be a very dominant contributor to the making of that decision.

But I do not feel—at least I do not understand that I have the unilateral right to override everything and say no. But certainly I

have been given every indication that it will be a very significant contribution to the decision.

Senator LEVIN. My question really is the opposite. My question is: Do you feel that if your recommendation is overridden by the Secretary that that requires you then to go along with the Secretary's decision, or are you still in your own mind and your own view of this office able to express publicly to the Congress your own independent view?

Mr. KRINGS. Oh, absolutely, yes. I think that that does not alter the facts. It just changes the decision.

Senator LEVIN. So unless you were persuaded that the Secretary was right, you would not swallow your own conclusion and be a good soldier on this? You would be willing to express your recommendation publicly, even though it differs with the decision of the Secretary?

Mr. KRINGS. If that opportunity came, I am sure I would be forced to do that, yes.

Senator LEVIN. Would you feel free to do that?

Mr. KRINGS. Absolutely. I would hopefully be free to express those things.

Senator LEVIN. The legislation which creates your office requires that you submit an annual report to this committee and to the Appropriations Committee. Now, what do you see as the permissible input of the Secretary's office in the year-end report to the Congress?

Mr. KRINGS. There is an understanding that the report—there are two types of reports, one at the end of a weapons system evaluation and one annual report. And it is my understanding that the report that our organization, our department, would write would go unchanged to the four committees.

The Secretary obviously has the opportunity to comment from whatever other sources he might have if he differs or if he agrees, whatever the case may be. But the basic report will not be altered. So my feeling is that you and others would get identically the same report as we generated, without any alteration.

Senator LEVIN. Is it your understanding that you would be forwarding these reports to the Congress in precisely the same form and with precisely the same content as those reports are originally submitted by you to the Secretary?

Mr. KRINGS. Yes; that is my understanding.

Senator LEVIN. So that there would not be any effort to get around that requirement by any contact with the Secretary's office, orally or in writing, of early drafts to get inputs which then could be taken into consideration in the draft actually or formally submitted to the Secretary's office?

It is your intention to carry out the spirit as well as the letter of that requirement?

Mr. KRINGS. Absolutely; yes.

Senator LEVIN. My last question is: Will you ensure that the annual reports which you send to us on the activities of your office include the results of the actual tests of systems which you just described?

Mr. KRINGS. Yes, yes, they will.

Senator LEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GOLDWATER. Mr. Krings is a member of an organization that has in my opinion the highest ethical standards of any organization I know of in this country, and that is the Association of Experimental Test Pilots.

I do not want to say that I am prejudiced but having been acquainted with this business for so many years I have never known of a man in his position, responsible for testing any piece of equipment, who found deficiencies in the equipment and then failed to so state to the manufacturer or whoever it was that was interested in the subject. It is an organization that is not well known and not talked about very often, but I have the highest regard for any member of it.

Now, we do not have—and I will entertain a motion that we approve Mr. Krings' nomination.

Senator NUNN. I so move.

Chairman GOLDWATER. Without objection, that will be ordered. Senator Hart will be recorded as voting "present," and that will be it.

Now, we will poll today on the rules for the subcommittees and nominations, since right at this moment we do not have a quorum. But we have had one, and there are pending before the committee and eligible for consideration today 2,088 routine military nominations. These have been before the committee for the required 7 days and no objections have been raised.

I am prepared to entertain a motion that these nominations be ordered favorably reported by the committee to the Senate.

Senator LEVIN. I so move.

Chairman GOLDWATER. Without objection, that will be done.

Now, do any of the other members have business that they care to bring before the committee?

[No response.]

[The questions submitted by the Senators of the Senate Armed Services Committee to be answered for the record follow:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR STROM THURMOND

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Krings, unfortunately, the way that the Department of Defense tests and evaluates weapons has come under increased scrutiny and criticism in recent years. It is imperative, however, that we get the most defense for the tax dollars spent, so yours is a position of great responsibility.

Mr. Krings, what do you see as your most important tasks in the months ahead?

Mr. KRINGS. The important tasks will be to:

- (a) Organize a competent independent oriented staff.
- (b) Review and analyze the immediate upcoming tests.
- (c) Establish the credibility and function of the office.

Senator THURMOND. What goals have you set for your department?

Mr. KRINGS. My goals are to establish absolute integrity and credibility and to create an atmosphere of candid communication with the Congress.

Senator THURMOND. Do you have any views at this time on changes that need to be made in the way we test and evaluate weapons?

Mr. KRINGS. I do not have a specific list of changes that I think need to be made immediately, but I intend to see that we will:

- (a) Insure the test goals are in keeping with the intended current and future use of the data.
- (b) Aggressively avoid unnecessary duplication in testing.
- (c) Educate the concerned individuals and organizations about contemporary testing.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR DAN QUAYLE

Senator QUAYLE. Mr. Krings, former Under Secretary of Defense Richard DeLauer and others have criticized Congress' move to create the office you hope to head. Their criticisms note that your office would simply be another layer of bureaucracy and would not necessarily lead to better and more rigorous testing of our weapons systems.

What is your view regarding these criticisms? Do you feel there is a valid role for OSD in the oversight of the services' test and evaluation programs?

Mr. KRINGS. Their criticisms are expected. No one welcomes more scrutiny. I believe there is a necessity in some areas to insure the results are analyzed and reported independently. Success oriented programs often lose objectivity and tend to organize tests to confirm goals.

Senator QUAYLE. How do you currently see the interface between your office and the services? Will your office simply be a policy shop or will you be reviewing specific test programs on systems currently in development?

Mr. KRINGS. We will work closely with the service independent test agencies to ensure that their test design for major programs is adequate to answer the critical operational effectiveness and suitability issues. We will observe tests in progress and provide an independent assessment of test results. We will establish operational test policy and review the resources required to support operational tests.

Senator QUAYLE. What, in your view, will be your initial challenges in getting the new OSD testing office off the ground? Has DOD in your view established a clear charter for the organization?

Mr. KRINGS. The initial challenge will be establishing credibility and roles. The charter is very clear in defining the independent authority of the office. There are some areas of responsibility and cooperation that may need further defining. This will be an early goal.

Senator QUAYLE. Will your office have formal veto power in the event you conclude that a particular test program on a system has not been adequate?

Mr. KRINGS. We will have the independence to assess and report, without alteration, the adequacy of the tests and the success of a system based on the approved test plan. We will recommend production, suggest further testing, or termination of the program. The Secretary of Defense must consider many factors, besides testing in his decision whether a program should proceed or not. Our independent assessment of test results will be a major factor in his decision but may not constitute a formal veto of the program to proceed.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR CARL LEVIN

Senator LEVIN. In almost every case, the office of the Director of Operational Testing will not actually conduct the tests that are being performed on different weapons systems. Instead your office will approve of individual service testing plans, sometimes observe those tests, and then review the results of that testing both for the Secretary of Defense and for the Congress.

Given this situation, to what extent will you rely on the use of consultants to perform the duties of the office of operational testing?

Mr. KRINGS. The office is currently negotiating a contract for scientific and technical assistance. The primary objective of this support is to have the contractor gather published studies and test reports for use by the staff of the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation. The support contractor will not be asked nor permitted to provide assessments of weapon system performance. These assessments will be the responsibility of the permanent staff. The contractor will maintain a test report data base and assist the staff in reviewing the facilities and resources being provided by the services in support of operational testing.

Senator LEVIN. How many persons are currently employed in your office?

Mr. KRINGS. Ten.

Senator LEVIN. Will the office expand?

Mr. KRINGS. The office is currently authorized 16 personnel. We will recruit the additional six personnel as soon as possible. After that I will assess our requirements based on workload experience.

Senator LEVIN. What steps will you take to ensure that persons you hire as consultants will be free from any conflict of interest?

Mr. KRINGS. I will personally review their involvement with other contractors or consultants—consultant contracts will contain suitable safeguards for potential subsequent conflict discovery.

Chairman GOLDWATER. The committee will stand adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:55 a.m., the committee was adjourned.]

[The nomination of John E. Krings was reported to the Senate by Senator Goldwater on Mar. 7, 1985, with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination was confirmed by the Senate on Apr. 16, 1985.]

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